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Abstract
The rationale of voluntary corporate initiatives is often explained
with preparedness for future regulation. We test this hypothesis for the
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) and the Climate Leaders (CL), two
popular voluntary US environmental programs to curb carbon emis-
sion that were operating during a decisive regulatory event. In 2009
the Waxman-Markey Bill surprisingly passed the House of Represen-
tatives and brought the US economy on the brink of a nationwide
CO2 emission trading system. In an event study we assess how the
stock market adjusted prices when the likelihood of CO2 regulation
suddenly increased. Our results suggest that only membership in the
CCX was considered beneficial, an initiative whose design happened to
dovetail with the bill. Earlier membership announcement effects paint
a complementary picture. But membership alone cannot account for
the entire price adjustments. Our results reveal that a substantial part
of the market reaction consisted of industry-wide effects.
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1 Introduction
The latest assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change once again stresses the critical impact of CO2 emissions on the
environment. Yet it does not seem likely that an agreement on a global
framework to tackle climate change is achieved anytime soon. Notably the
United States, one of the leading nations in greenhouse gas emissions, lacks
federal legislation that addresses carbon emissions on firm level.1 This was
suddenly bound to change on 26 June 2009, when the US House of Rep-
resentatives narrowly passed H.R. 2454, the “American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009”. Dubbed the Waxman-Markey Bill, this act aimed to
cap CO2 emissions in the US with an emission trading system. The passage
of this bill caught the public off guard. Even though the bill was gradually
defeated later on, its success in the House of Representatives unexpectedly
and substantially increased the likelihood of federal carbon legislation in the
US.
Some firms seemed better prepared in light of this abrupt shift in looming
legislation. Binding voluntary environmental initiatives credibly signal com-
mitment and can provide a learning environment to improve the corporate
footprint. In this paper we ask whether being a member in fitting initiatives
pays off in risky times. To this end, we conduct an event study to compare
the implications of corporate membership in two major CO2 abating pro-
grams that were operating during the passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill,
the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) and the Climate Leaders (CL). More
precisely, we analyze whether membership in the CCX and CL initiatives
was rewarded by the financial markets in view of the unanticipated rise in
likelihood of federal legislation. If this is the case, one motivation for firms
to join such programs could indeed be preparation for regulation. In keeping
with this argument, Bruce Braine, vice president of strategic policy analysis
for American Electric Power described the motivation to participate in the
CCX as follows: “Many of us were doing this not only to make voluntary
commitments, but as a way that we could get prepared for a mandatory
future. [...] We were learning the ropes, learning about trading and trying
to become more proficient in reducing our carbon footprint over time.” (Na-
tional Geographic News, 2010) On the other hand, a lacking market reaction
upon the passing of the bill would not speak for an economic value of such
memberships for pending regulation.
Our study exploits a unique opportunity to compare two different designs
to tackle CO2 emissions. The CL initiative pursued a broad approach with
1There are regional efforts: California has recently introduced a cap-and-trade program.
However, the large number of allocated pollution permits has lead to a price decay. Other
initiatives encompass several states. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative aims to
reduce greenhouse gases in nine US states in the northeast and is limited to large fossil
fuel power plants.
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support from the US government. The CCX program was more streamlined,
relied on independent verification, and was based on a market mechanism.
As it happens, a similar mechanism was foreseen in the bill. We show that
the particular fit of the design bears importance the the prescribed economic
value. Our comparison thus adds another determinant to the relationship
between environmental and economic performance (for a survey, see Blanco
et al., 2009).
In order to round up the picture, in a complementary event study we
compare how differently, if at all, the earlier announcement to join these
programs had been gaged by the stock market. The direction of a possible
reaction is not readily obvious. On the one hand, a shift to an engagement
in voluntary programs could be perceived as detrimental from an investor’s
point of view. This is the case if the marginal benefits of the engagement
are lower than its marginal costs. Oberndorfer et al. (2013) for example
show that the inclusion in a sustainability stock index is valued negatively
by the stock market. On the other hand, investors might perceive voluntary
carbon reduction programs as a fitting training ground to acquire technical
knowledge and improve operational efficiency, an advantage that increases
the marginal benefits of these programs. If so, stock market reactions could
be favorable. For CL firms, this very question was previously answered in an
event study by Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011). In the seeming absence
of regulatory pressure, newly declared CL firms were vigorously penalized
in terms of falling stock prices. Our second event study complements this
picture with CCX membership announcement effects.
There is existing research on CCX membership announcement reac-
tions and reactions to the Waxman-Markey Bill, but there remain serious
questions. Using a conventional difference-in-differences framework with
monthly stock returns, Gans and Hintermann (2013) purport that, for both
the membership announcements and the Waxman-Markey Bill, the stock
market reacted favorably towards CCX firms. However, the effects for CL
firms (in Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn) and for CCX firms (in Gans and
Hintermann) are not directly comparable. For one, test statistics of short-
horizon event studies are better specified than those of long-horizon event
studies. More importantly, the CCX sample was not screened for confound-
ing factors. This is not just a minor technical quibble. It is not clear to
what extent the estimated return effects for the CCX firms in Gans and
Hintermann’s study are actually attributable to the events in question.
This paper thus pieces together a puzzle by extending, rectifying, and
refining the existing findings. We provide a comprehensive and nuanced
picture of the perceived value of membership in voluntary corporate climate
initiatives by means of conclusive event studies. Our analysis fills two gaps
in the literature. First, we establish a direct comparision of two distinct
initiatives. There already is reason to believe that the market had deemed
the value of becoming a member in these two programs differently, so we
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might also observe disparate reactions when push came to shove with the
Waxman-Markey Bill. We argue that an environmental program that is
tailored to the specific threat of future regulation by a mandated cap-and-
trade system is likely to be a more effective tool to mediate the effect of an
according shock. To round up the comparison of the two initiatives, we jux-
tapose the prior market reactions towards the membership announcements.
In our second contribution to the literature, we highlight the important role
of industry-specific effects when assessing the impact of unexpected regu-
lation. It turns out that industry-specific effects explain a substantial part
of the observed market reaction for CCX firms and fully account for the
reactions for CL firms during the Waxman-Markey Bill. This supports the
notion that the passage of the bill had not been priced in by the market. But
more importantly, this insight stresses that neglecting industry-wide effects
bears the risk of misinterpreting selective data.
The results of our event studies are in accord with the conjecture that,
by and large, membership in the CCX initiative was throughout considered
more valuable than membership in the CL. Conservative estimates suggest
that, on average, stock prices of CCX members experienced positive abnor-
mal returns of 0.7 percent during the passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill.
CL members, on the other hand, hardly provoked any abnormal returns.
In our complementary event study we find no measurable market reaction
for firms announcing membership to the CCX. Taken together, these results
qualify and reconcile previous findings and paint a coherent picture of the
perceived market value of the two initiatives.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides
background information on the Waxman-Markey Bill, the two voluntary
corporate climate initiatives, and the related literature. Section 3 lays out
the event study methodology, followed by the description of our data in
Section 4. The results of the two event studies are presented in Section 5,
and the last section concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Waxman-Markey
H.R. 2454, the “American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009” was a
Bill to propose, among other things, the introduction of a cap-and-trade
system. The bill, also known as the Waxman-Markey Bill, would regulate
the emission of greenhouse gases in the United States, in particular CO2.
The new law was to replace existing voluntary action with mandatory leg-
islation. Over the next 40 years carbon emissions were to be increasingly
capped up to 83% of 2005 levels. Allocated with CO2 allowances, regulated
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firms would be free to trade their pollution rights at market prices.2
After months of negotiations, on Friday June 26 2009 at 7:17 p.m. the
House of Representatives narrowly passed the bill by a vote of 219 to 212.
The media response proclaimed the legislation as historic for the United
States and a victory for the Obama administration. The outcome had
remained rather unlikely to the end and stirred up subsequent emotions,
pointing towards a controversial and unexpected decision. Actual market
data support the qualitative impression of the passing as a surprise (Meng,
2013).3 In Section 5 we identify industry-specific effects that lend additional
support to the unexpected nature of the passage of the bill.
Although at that time it still remained to be seen whether the Senate
would approve the bill as well, there was suddenly good reason to believe
that firms were more likely to face substantial costs in terms of CO2 reduc-
tion efforts in the near future. In contrast, the eventual defeat of the bill
did not exhibit any sudden change in expectations. There was gradually less
support over the months following the passage in the House of Represen-
tatives, leading up to the eventual defeat in the Senate in July 2010. This
only makes the passage of the bill (and not its defeat) a viable candidate for
an event study.
2.2 Chicago Climate Exchange and Climate Leaders
Two major initiatives to curb greenhouse gas emissions in the US were oper-
ating during the passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill. Both initiatives had
been launched in the early 2000s. The so-called Chicago Climate Exchange
(CCX) was a trade platform for CO2 certificates. Its members agreed to
a reduction goal and independent verification of their efforts. As such, the
CCX could be considered some type of predecessor to the government-based
emission trading system intended by the Waxman-Markey Bill. The second
initiative was the Climate Leaders (CL) program, which was an industry-
government partnership to help firms reduce emissions of six major green-
house gases. Participating members pledged to a realistic reduction goal
2Although the cap-and-trade system constituted the most prominent element of the
legislation, the contents of the bill extend beyond this market instrument. It was a com-
prehensive strategy to address climate change. As such, the bill included policies of
“creating a combined energy efficiency and renewable electricity standard and requiring
retail electricity suppliers to meet 20% of their demand through renewable electricity and
electricity savings by 2020” and “setting a goal of, and requiring a strategic plan for,
improving overall U.S. energy productivity by at least 2.5% per year by 2012 and main-
taining that improvement rate through 2030”. The bill was accessed on October 9 2012
on http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2454
3Meng (2013) studies contract prices on the online trading exchange Intrade. In 2009
and 2010, a prediction market contract on the prospects of a U.S. cap-and-trade system
was hosted on this exchange, essentially reflecting market expectations on the probability
of this event. The time series of this contract’s price indicates that the market swiftly
adjusted expectations upon the passing of the bill.
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within a five to ten year time frame. Although these two initiatives pursued
the same goal, their approaches differed in fundamental aspects. We present
each initiative in turn.
In 2003, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) started trading opera-
tions of the first cap-and-trade system in North America with 13 charter
members that made voluntary but legally binding commitments to reduce
six different types of greenhouse gas emissions.4 The exchange was char-
acterized by a market mechanism; a platform where prices were considered
and allowances exchanged, and where strategic interaction took place. As
part of its cap-and-trade scheme the CCX relied on a carbon offset program
with its own standards for allowances and offset credits called “Carbon Fi-
nancial Instrument Contracts”. Established emission baselines and emission
reports were verified independently. The CCX timeline can be divided into
two distinct phases. From 2003 to 2006 members had to cut their emissions
annually by 1% below their baseline average as defined from 1998 to 2001.
In the second phase from 2007 to 2010, existing members had to cut emis-
sions annually by 0.5% while new members had to cut emissions by 1.5%. In
addition to the direct emitters (CCX members) there were associate mem-
bers, offset providers, liquidity providers, and exchange participants. Over
the course of its operation the exchange had had around 400 members with
annual membership fees ranging from 1,000-60,000 USD, depending on firm
size and membership type.5 In November 2010, the CCX announced that
it would shut down the program, arguing that firms were no longer inter-
ested in trading emission credits in the absence of government legislation
(Financial Times, 2010).
The Climate Leaders Greenhouse Gas Inventory Protocol is the second
major voluntary initiative that operated during the passage of the Waxman-
Markey Bill. Formed in 2002, the Climate Leaders (CL) initiative was based
on the Greenhouse Gas Protocol developed by the World Resources Insti-
tute and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. The CL
members did not restrict themselves to CO2 reductions but dedicated them-
selves to six main greenhouse gas emissions. These emissions were grouped
into direct emissions (known as Scope 1), indirect emissions (known as Scope
2), and offered the reduction of optional emissions (known as Scope 3). In
contrast to the CCX, the CL program was an industry-government part-
nership initiated by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that
worked with companies to develop comprehensive climate change strategies.
Upon becoming a partner, the EPA assisted each company in developing
inventory and inventory management plans. Partners then set a corporate-
wide domestic or global five to ten year greenhouse gas reduction goal and
4CCX Fact Sheet, December 2011. https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ccx/CCX_
Fact_Sheet.pdf, visited on January 14 2013
5http://co2offsetresearch.org/policy/CCX.html, visited on December 20 2012
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reported annual inventory data to the EPA. In addition, partners were to
document their progress towards the goal (Tonkonogy and Oliva, 2007).
But unlike the CCX, the CL did not rely on mandatory third party veri-
fication, rendering their environmental efforts less traceable. This difference
can have serious consequences. In a field experiment, Telle (2013) finds ev-
idence that firms under-report environmental violations in self-audits. To
external parties, then, the CL design radiates less credibility in terms of
commitment than the CCX design.
Four types of reduction goals were eligible for CL members: absolute,
normalized, indexed, or carbon neutrality. Upon engagement, the EPA eval-
uated the proposed reduction goals from all partners, requiring a reduction
compared to the projected GHG performance of the sector. Partners were
also allowed to develop their own mitigation offset projects or purchase cer-
tified mandatory or voluntary GHG reductions, provided that the projects
adhered to approved EPA methodologies. Contrary to the CCX, there were
no explicit market mechanisms at work. Upon joining, it was not decision-
making based on market prices that influenced the daily carbon business.
Instead, according to the EPA, partners were sure to receive high level
recognition via participation in meetings, public outreach, or press events
(Tonkonogy and Oliva, 2007). Members also profited from the EPA’s tech-
nical assistance. On September 15 2010, the EPA announced their decision
to cease operation of the CL program in light of new political developments.
2.3 Related Literature
Traditional economic analysis assumes that firms already behave optimally,
with pollution being an inevitable side product of production (Cropper and
Oates, 1992). So at first glance, there is no rationale to voluntarily reduce
pollution. Yet it turns out that one can explain such voluntary engagement
in a number of ways. The literature has identified a variety of economic
motives, some of which are based on some sort of imperfect markets (for an
overview, see Khanna, 2002; Portney, 2008). These motives can be roughly
divided into market motives and political motives (Fleckinger and Glachant,
2011).
Political motives seem particularly interesting for our case. Lyon and
Maxwell (2003, 2008) argue that by participating in voluntary environmen-
tal initiatives firms seek to preempt or shape future public policies. On
this note, perhaps the most pertinent argument that rationalizes voluntary
participation in our setting is preparation for some expected legislation. If
there is reason to believe that with a non-negligible probability future en-
vironmental legislation will impose costly regulation upon firms, it might
be reasonable to dampen the impact of such a future shock by adjusting
corporate behavior today and thus prepare voluntarily. For a smooth path
towards the expected extent of the regulation entails lower overall costs
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than a sudden adjustment. Unexpected changes in legislation such as the
Waxman-Markey Bill provide a testing ground for this hypothesis. If the
market correctly interprets the impact of suddenly looming legislation, we
should observe immediate changes for the prices of markedly affected stocks.
There is a large body of evidence that supports the view that a sudden
increase in the likelihood of future regulation is taken into account by the
market. For instance, Bowen et al. (1983) and Hill and Schneeweis (1983)
suggest that the nuclear incident at the Three Mile Island facility in 1979
altered the investors’ perception of future regulation by resulting in a sud-
den drop in stock prices for electric utility firms, in particular for those
who were invested in nuclear power. The chemical disaster in Bhopal in
1984 had a similar effect. Once the extent of the tragedy had become clear,
the market seemingly anticipated tighter regulation for the entire chemical
industry (Blacconiere and Patten, 1994). Price shocks can trigger market
reactions as well. Bushnell et al. (2013) show that the 50% drop in the EU
CO2 allowance price in 2006 affected stock prices in carbon- and electricity-
intensive industries. Unexpected policy changes can work as shocks, too.
The sudden proposal by President George Bush in 1989 to revise the Clean
Air Act triggered a drop in stock prices of notoriously polluting coal firms
(Freedman and Patten, 2004; Kahn and Knittel, 2003). And very recently,
the unexpected reaction of the German government to the Fukushima inci-
dent affected energy companies’ shareholder wealth (Betzer et al., 2013).
By and large, this suggests that the market interprets new and strict
regulation as impending threats. Yet some firms seem to fare better in
harsh times. There is empirical evidence that voluntary engagement and
subsequent verified disclosure is rewarded by the market because of their
informational value when external shocks materialize. For example, more
extensively disclosing firms were at an advantage after the chemical leak in
Bhopal (Blacconiere and Patten, 1994). The same held true after the sudden
legislation in the US in 1986 to handle contaminated sites (Blacconiere and
Northcut, 1997). And firms that were part of the Carbon Disclosure Project
experienced an increase in shareholder value when Russia unexpectedly rat-
ified the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 (Kim and Lyon, 2011). All of these events
qualify as external shocks that increased the likelihood for environmental
regulation.
The Waxman-Markey Bill has all the hallmarks of such a regulatory
shock. The market suddenly needed to price in new information in light of
pending future regulation, a regulation that would affect entire industries.
Against this background, the two voluntary initiatives in question, the CCX
and the CL program, were informative of the members’ preparedness for the
upcoming regulation. If these initiatives were deemed advantageous by the
market, the members of the programs should have fared relatively better in
terms of stock price adjustments.
There are two studies addressing the economic value of membership in
8
voluntary environmental initiatives that are directly related to our paper.
The event study by Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) investigates the
announcement effects for firms joining the CL program. The study finds
striking negative abnormal returns for announcing membership. On the
day of the announcement, stock market returns of the new CL firms per-
formed one percent worse than expected. Announcing a binding CO2 target
incurred an additional penalty of 1.1 percent.
The second paper that relates to our work is the study by Gans and
Hintermann (2013). Gans and Hintermann investigate stock returns of CCX
members on a monthly basis. Contrary to the CL firms in Fisher-Vanden and
Thorburn, they find significant positive abnormal returns for announcing
membership to the CCX. Gans and Hintermann, too, consider the passing
of the Waxman-Markey Bill as a shock. They assess the financial impact of
the bill on CCX firms and find a positive market reaction from one month
to the next. However, that study design contains serious methodological
drawbacks. While the results of their difference-in-differences framework
are helpful, such a methodology is rather unusual when using market data
to estimate the financial impact of unexpected events. The large time win-
dow associated with monthly returns makes it difficult to isolate the effect of
membership. Brown and Warner (1980), for instance, document the prob-
lem of using monthly data by illustrating that the degree of misspecification
in event tests can be severe. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that the
reported impact of the Waxman-Markey Bill was not screened for confound-
ing events at the firm level during the time of the event. In a well-known
replication study, McWilliams and Siegel (1997) highlight the importance of
accounting for such confoundings.
We address these issues and reconcile the existing evidence. Our pa-
per follows the precise event study methodology applied in Fisher-Vanden
and Thorburn and provides conclusive and comprehensive results of the im-
pacts of membership announcement for CCX firms on the one hand and
the Waxman-Markey Bill for both CCX and CL firms on the other hand.
Our results benefit from higher explanatory power and allow for a direct
comparison of the two initiatives for two kariotic moments.
3 Methodology
This section constructs an event study and uses financial market informa-
tion (stock prices) to deduce the effects of our events on firm value.6 This
approach has the advantage that it isolates the causal chain quite effectively.
An event has a direct impact on the stock price, similar to a treatment ef-
6Event studies have become an indispensable tool in econometrics. MacKinlay (1997)
gives a comprehensive overview of the history, theory, and application of event studies in
economics.
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fect. The statistical inference in an event study relies on three assumptions
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997): market efficiency, a lack of confounding ef-
fects during the event window, and under-/overestimation or no anticipation
of the event. Indeed, if the event in question had been anticipated, investors
would have already had priced in its predicted impact on firm value. Al-
though the passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill was not out of question,
Section 2.1 presented evidence that it was largely unexpected and provided
the market with new information.
The measurement of the value impact of an event is carried out by cal-
culating the so-called abnormal return. The abnormal return (AR) is the
observed return minus the normal return during a specified event window,
where the normal return is the return that one would expect to occur if the
event had not taken place. The abnormal return ARiτ is given by equation 1,
where E(Riτ |Xτ ) is the expected return Riτ given Xτ .
ARiτ = Riτ − E(Riτ |Xτ ) (1)
In financial economics, the normal return is often modeled via the mar-
ket model, which relates the return of interest Riτ to the market return
Rmτ . In a nutshell, the market model isolates the fraction of the return that
is associated with the market return, rendering the return of interest more
informative. The parameter estimates of the market model are calculated in
an Ordinary Least Squares framework on the basis of a preceding estimation
window. In addition to the market return, our specification additionally em-
ploys Fama-French’s "small minus big" (SMB) and "high minus low" (HML)
factors on a daily basis as explanatory variables (Fama and French, 1992,
1993). Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) illustrate that the addition of these
factors achieves the highest reduction of residual cross-correlation. Taken
together, we estimate the following model specification:
Riτ = αi + βi1 ·Rmτ + βi1 · SMBτ + βi2 ·HMLτ + iτ (2)
SMB in equation 2 denotes the daily difference of a portfolio of small
and big firms and HML indicates the daily difference of a portfolio of low
and high book-to-market value firms.7 iτ is the remaining error term after
estimating E(Riτ |Xτ ) and follows from iτ = ARiτ = Riτ − E(Riτ |Xτ )
via equation 1. We call the model in equation 2 the 3-factor model or
the baseline specification. We extend this specification by adding industry
return factors ESretjτ and BSretγτ in equation 3 and 4, respectively, to
control for industry effects:
7Downloaded from Kenneth French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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Riτ = αi + β1i ·Rmτ + β2i · SMBτ + β3i ·HMLτ + β4i · ESretjτ + iτ (3)
Riτ = αi + β1i ·Rmτ + β2i · SMBτ + β3i ·HMLτ + β4i ·BSretγτ + iτ (4)
In ESretjτ , j denotes one of 10 economic sectors and in BUSretγτ ,
γ denotes one of 25 business sectors according to the Thomson Reuters
Business Classification.
The event takes place after the estimation window and is usually placed
inside the so-called event window, during which the observed returns are
compared to the expected ones. Because some events cannot be unambigu-
ously dated, for example due to gradual information leakage or potential
insider information, researchers often include several days around the offi-
cial date τ = 0 into the event window. However, this comes at a cost. A
longer time series of ARiτ diminishes the power of the test statistics and
tends to increase the number of confounding events. Not to mention that
a long event window is even more difficult to reconcile with the notion of
market efficiency. Contrary to long-horizon event studies, the test statistics
of short-horizon event studies are generally less sensitive to the benchmark
model of normal returns and issues of both cross-sectional and time-series
dependence of abnormal returns (Kothari and Warner, 2007).
In our data, Riτ is the total return index based on closing prices. The
closing price of day τ − 1 is the opening price of day τ . In the event window
notation [T2, T3], T2 referres to the opening price on day τ = 0 and T3
to the closing price on day τ . The event window [1, 1] therefore captures
the return on the day after the event day τ = 0. We are interested in
two events, the Waxman-Markey Bill and membership announcements. In
our first event study, we define the Waxman-Markey event day, Friday 26
June 2009, as τ = 0 and set the estimation window to 60 trading days
from T0 = −59 to T1 = 0. For the Waxman-Markey event, the event day
τ = 0, a Friday, is included in this estimation window, for two reasons:
First, the vote took place at 7pm and therefore after the closing of the
stock exchanges. Second, the issue of potential information leakage can
be excluded because the outcome of the vote was extremely close and the
public outcry thereafter was substantial. Speaking in trading days, our
event window [1, 1] is set rather narrowly after the event and captures the
abnormal returns on day one after the event, Monday June 29, with T2 = 1
and T3 = 1. Note, however, that the weekend precedes the event window,
which should provide enough time for the news to spread. We also employ
a second, longer window that estimates the returns over [1, 2].
For the second event in question, the CCX membership announcements,
we extend the narrow event windows to take into account potential prior
information leakage. To allow for a direct comparison for the CL mem-
bership announcement effects in Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) we
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choose their event windows [0, 1], [−1, 1], and [−2, 2]. Setting the estima-
tion window to 60 days thus sets a span from T0 = −62 to T1 = −3. In
turn, the cross-sectional abnormal returns ARiτ in the event window are
cumulated from T2 until T3. This yields the cumulative abnormal returns
CARi[T2,T3] =
∑T3
τ=T2 ARiτ . Average CARs are obtained by averaging the
CARs across the observations: ACAR[T2,T3] = 1n
∑n
i=1CARi[T2,T3].
The raw returns are useful for economic interpretations. Standardized
returns, however, have been proven to exhibit better statistical properties
(Patell, 1976). The scaled abnormal returns are equal to SARiτ = ARiτS(ARi) ,
where S(ARi) =
√
σ2i ∗ [1 + x′t(X ′X)−1xt] denotes the sampling error cor-
rection. The SARs can be cumulated over time as well: CSARi[T2,T3] =∑T3
τ=T2 SARiτ . The cross sectional means of these cumulative standardized
abnormal returns are equal to ASCAR[T2,T3] = 1n
∑n
i=1CSARi[T2,T3].
In comparison to a conventional t-test or Patell’s test, the test proposed
by Boehmer et al. (1991) given in equation 5 is robust against event induced
variance inflation. Harrington and Shrider (2013) show that the presence
of heterogeneous effects induces event variance. Robust tests against cross-
sectional variation in the true abnormal return should therefore be preferred.
tBMP =
ACSAR · √n
1
n−1
∑n
i=1(CSARi −ACSAR)2
(5)
A particular issue for the Waxman-Markey event is clustering. In con-
trast to the membership announcements, the bill affected the firms simul-
taneously at the same point in time. One might thus question the assump-
tion that iτ is independent and identically distributed. MacKinlay (1997)
suggests that clustering can be accommodated in two ways. Either by a
portfolio approach which allows for cross correlation of the abnormal re-
turns, or by analyzing the abnormal returns without aggregation, e.g. by
including a dummy for the event day. The latter approach has two draw-
backs. Such a test will generally suffer from poor finite sample properties
and has little power against reasonable alternatives. As a remedy, Kolari
and Pynnonen (2010) propose a modification of the test statistic developed
by Boehmer et al. (1991) that is not affected by clustering. Kolari and
Pynnonen’s statistic increases the cross sectional variance used by Boehmer
et al. (1991) by adjusting for the average covariance of the error terms ρ¯
during the estimation window:
tKP = tBMP
√
1− ρ¯
1 + (n− 1)ρ¯ (6)
We consider the Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) test statistic to be the most
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appropriate for our samples. In addition, we make use of the non-parametric
generalized rank test proposed in Kolari et al. (2010) to check the robustness
of our parametric tests. We choose the generalized rank test because it has
better properties for testing CARs than the conventional rank test and is
equally well suited for testing single day abnormal returns.
4 Data
This section describes our CCX and CL samples. Gans and Hintermann
have kindly provided us with their CCX database and data on their selection
process.8 Their final sample for the Waxman-Markey event consists of 32
firms. We start with the same CCX database consisting of 109 members.
Of these, 20 are government-affiliated and are cities, states, or universities.
From the remaining 89 observations, we find listings for 57 firms in the US.
From these listings we drop seven firms with discontinuous price indices,
a sure sign of illiquid securities. From the remaining 53 firms, seven are
American Depositary Receipts and three are not major listings or have their
book values not denominated in USD. This leaves us with 40 identified CCX
member firms for the Waxman-Markey event.
For a direct comparison to the CCX program we compile a database
of CL firms. Recall that Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn only identify the an-
nouncement effect of firms joining CL. We extend their analysis and identify
the effect of the Waxman-Markey Bill on then operating CL members. Our
database starts with a CL member list retrieved from the US Environmental
Protection Agency as of 8 May 2009.9 Of the 264 members at that time, we
focus on the 19 achiever and 87 setter firms. The remaining 158 so-called
developer firms are by definition at a very early stage of their membership.
That status is hardly an advantage in light of the Waxman-Markey Bill. In-
deed, the majority of the developer firms later on opted out of the program,
questioning their motivation and commitment in the first place. For that
reason, we exclude developer firms from our CL database.10 Although we
lack detailed membership status for the day of the passage of the Waxman-
Markey Bill, Table A1 in the appendix illustrates the development of the
CL program over time. Of the 106 Climate Leaders with setter and achiever
status, we identify 65 as being listed on a US stock market. Among these
stocks, there are five illiquid equity return indices and three ADR listings.
This yields an identified sample of 57 CL firms for the Waxman-Markey
8Their CCX sample is from 2010, but we found a document form February 2009 that
lists the same CCX members: http://www.epa.gov/agstar/documents/workshop09/
mccomb.pdf, visited on December 10 2012.
9Obtained through www.archive.org on November 6 2012 via web.archive.org/web/
20090508120744/http://epa.gov/climateleaders/partners/index.html
10urlhttp://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/documents/partners_letter_15sep2010.pdf,
visited on December 9 2012
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event.
The first row of Table A2 lists the identified firms for both programs. For
the Waxman-Markey event we conducted a thorough analysis of confounding
events from 26 June 2009 (Friday) through 30 June 2009 (Tuesday) for both
the CCX and the CL sample. For each firm in our two samples, we searched
LexisNexis for unexpected announcements that were published in major US
news outlets and which were likely to affect market value during the event
window. The second row in Table A2 lists the number of confounding events
for each program. For the 57 CL firms, we identify 16 confounding events,
leaving us with a final CL sample of 41 firms. For the 40 firms in the
CCX sample we identify confounding events for nine firms, leaving us with
a final CCX sample of 31 firms. An overview of our final samples for the
Waxman-Markey event is given in Tables A3 and A4. We classify three
samples: A pure CCX sample, a pure CL sample, and a pooled sample of
CCX and CL firms. Table A3 lists our final CCX sample and indicates
charter member status where applicable. Table A4 lists the final CL sample
with the according membership status and whether the respective firms were
charter partners.
In addition to the Waxman-Markey event we are interested in member-
ship announcement effects. Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn have done this
analysis for CL firms, so we restrict our attention to CCX member firms.
To determine this sample we start with the same CCX database and apply
the same filters as mentioned above. For the identified firms we search both
Google and LexisNexis for membership announcement dates, resulting in the
sample of 26 firms shown in Table A2. In contrast to the Waxman-Markey
event here we cumulate abnormal returns for longer event windows due to
potential information leakage. We search for confounding events up to two
days before and two days after each membership announcement. We find
six confounding events and end up with a sample of 20 CCX firms for the
membership announcement event.
5 Results
This section presents the event study results for our two incidents. First,
we investigate the market reaction to the Waxman-Markey Bill to our three
samples, CCX, CL, and CCX plus CL. Second, we take a look at the mar-
ket reaction to membership announcements for CCX firms alone, offering a
direct comparison to the same reaction towards CL firms observed in Fisher-
Vanden and Thorburn (2011).
5.1 Event Returns: Waxman-Markey Bill
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the three samples. The pooled sam-
ple comprises 61 firms. On their own, the CCX sample consists of 31 firms
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
CL & CCX CCX CL
Number of firms 60 31 41
Market value (MV, billion USD)
Mean MV 18.1 17.7 24.1
Median MV 6.7 4.8 11.1
Total sales (billion USD)
Mean sales 20.8 23.2 23.1
Median sales 10.3 9.3 14.4
Market-to-book equity (MEBE)
Mean MEBE 1.9 2.1 2.0
Median MEBE 2.0 1.3 2.3
Fraction of sample firms in TRBC* sector:
Basic Materials 0.18 0.32 0.07
Consumer Cyclicals 0.15 0.06 0.20
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 0.05 0.00 0.07
Financials 0.02 0.03 0.02
Healthcare 0.05 0.03 0.07
Industrials 0.15 0.13 0.17
Technology 0.22 0.13 0.29
Utilities 0.18 0.29 0.10
*TRBC: Thomson Reuters Business Classification.
The market value (MV) of equity is calculated seven trading days
before June 29 2009.
The mnemonic of sales is WC01001 and of book equity WC03501
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and the CL sample 41 contains firms, meaning that six firms are members in
both programs. The distribution of the market capitalization is positively
skewed for the CCX and the CL samples, with CL members being substan-
tially bigger. The two samples differ in the distribution of their sale volumes
as well. Although CL firms have, on average, the same turnover as CCX
firms, their median is higher. A similar skew is visible in market-to-book
numbers. While the average of market-to-book equity is the same in both
samples, the medians indicate a proclivity for value firms in the CCX sam-
ple and for growth firms in the CL sample. The two samples also differ in
their industry exposures. Two economic sectors as classified by the Thomson
Reuters Industry Classification are absent from our samples: Telecommuni-
cations and Energy. The other economic sectors are not equally distributed,
neither across the CL nor the CCX sample. For example, the CCX sam-
ple harbors a larger fraction of basic materials and utilities, whereas the
CL sample shows a tilt towards technology firms. We account for these
differences in our extended model specifications.
We first estimate abnormal returns for all three samples using our base-
line specification. To allow for value-relevant information to distribute and
sink in, we conduct analyses for two event windows after the passage of the
bill. Based on the baseline market model given by equation 2 we calculate
the cumulated abnormal returns CAR[1,1] for Monday (29 June) only and
CAR[1,2], which includes the following Tuesday.
Table 2 presents the abnormal returns and their derivatives according
to our baseline specification. The results for the event windows [1,1] and
[1,2] are depicted in panels A and B, respectively. Across all samples, the
average cumulated abnormal returns (ACAR) for the short event window
are close to 0.5%. Their standardized counterparts (CSAR) are substan-
tially lower. Among the three samples, the CCX firms exhibit the highest
standardized returns. The two-sided BMP test statistic by Boehmer et al.
(1991) is highly significant across the board. The null hypothesis of normal
returns is rejected at the 0.1% significance level for the CCX firms and at
a slighty higher level for the CL firms. As expected, the more conservative
KP p-values according to Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) are higher (roughly
3% for the CCX firms and 7.6% for CL firms). Finally, the nonparametric
generalized rank test also rejects the null hypothesis of normal returns for
the short event window.
The cumulated abnormal returns over two days in panel B indicate that
the ACAR of the CCX sample increased to over 0.7% whereas the ACAR
of the CL sample declined to 0.35%. This suggests that the market incorpo-
rated additional price information on the second day after the event. The
BMP statistic remains significant across the samples for this longer event
window; for the CCX firms once again at the 0.1% level and less signifi-
cantly for the CL firms at the 10% level. The KP p-values, however, only
remain significant for the CCX and the pooled sample. Put differently, a
16
conservative estimation suggests that the CL firms do not seem to exhibit
abnormal returns when cumulated over two days. Again, the generalized
rank test dovetails with the KP test.
Taken together, these results are consistent with the idea that financial
markets believed that firms engaging in voluntary measures of carbon emis-
sion reduction get a head start in preparing for imminent federal carbon
emission legislation. But not our two programs did not encounter equal
praise. Based on the results of the baseline market model, membership in
the CCX is considered more beneficial in light of the Waxman-Markey Bill
compared to membership in the CL program.
All the same, the heterogeneous sector distributions for the CCX and
CL firms give pause. The CL and CCX firms are not readily comparable
in terms of sector distribution. But the empirical evidence listed in Section
2 suggests that some sectors exhibit a higher vulnerability to regulatory
shocks. The results in Table 2 are based on the baseline 3-factor model,
which benchmarks a firm’s returns against the market return and the two
Fama-French risk factors SMB and HML. As such, the results are prone to
industry-specific effects. These specific effects could stem from two potential
sources. For one, firms from industries that are generally positively affected
by a mandatory emission cap-and-trade system could be more likely to opt
into voluntary emission reduction programs. Second, the Waxman-Markey
event took place in the midst of an economic recession, a recession which
did not affect all industries alike. In order to isolate the CCX and CL
membership effect from such overarching effects, we proceed by controlling
for industry-specific confoundings and extend the baseline market model
with both economic and, to reach a deeper level, business sector returns.
In a first step, we incorporate industry return factors from 10 economic
sectors. For each security i in sector j we add to the baseline market model
the economic sector return j as defined in equation 3. Table A5 summarizes
the results of this second specification. It turns out that economic sector
returns explain a substantial part of the observed positive effects from the
baseline specification. By any measure of statistical significance and for both
event windows, the abnormal returns of the pooled sample are no longer dif-
ferent from zero. The two pure samples present a more nuanced picture. In
the previous analysis, the CL sample only showed significant returns for the
short event window. This significance now disappears altogether with the
inclusion of industry-specific effects. The CCX sample, on the other hand,
keeps showing (slightly less) significant abnormal returns, in particular for
the longer event window. In this window, the CARs and CSARs for the CCX
firms are somewhat reduced. The second model specification thus indicates
that positive sectoral effects have been at work, much more so for the CL
than for the CCX sample. This also explains why the perpetually observable
abnormal returns for the CCX sample dilutes in the pooled sample.
To further check the robustness of the economic sector results, we ex-
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Table 2: 3-Factor Model
CL&CCX CCX CL
Panel A: Event Window [1,1]
ACAR 0.450 0.437 0.476
ACSAR 0.264 0.324 0.230
BMP t-statistic 3.403 2.960 2.533
BMP p-val 0.001 0.006 0.015
KP t-statistic 2.298 2.280 1.820
KP p-val 0.025 0.030 0.076
GRank Test 2.745 2.605 2.248
GRank p-val 0.008 0.012 0.028
No. of Observations 60 31 41
Panel B: Event Window [1,2]
ACAR 0.310 0.789 0.347
ACSAR 0.375 0.540 0.275
BMP t-statistic 2.937 3.087 1.924
BMP p-val 0.005 0.004 0.061
KP t-statistic 1.983 2.378 1.383
KP p-val 0.052 0.024 0.174
GRank Test 2.105 2.354 1.619
GRank p-val 0.040 0.022 0.111
No. of Observations 60 31 41
ACAR & ACSAR are in %. There is a 60 days estimation window from
2 April to 26 June 2009. The event window [1,1] captures the abnormal
returns on 29 June 2009. The event window [1,2] adds 30 June 2009.
The BMP test (Boehmer et al. 1991) is an extension of Patell (1976) and
robust against event induced variance. The KP test (Kolary & Pynnö-
nen, 2010) is adjusting the BMP test for cross sectional correlation. The
average correlations of abnormal returns ρ¯ in our samples are ρ¯cl&ccx =
0.020, ρ¯ccx = 0.022 , and ρ¯cl = 0.023 . The non-parametric GRank
test is the generalized rank test for cumulated returns from Kolari and
Pynnönen (2010a).
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tend the market model by adding to each security i in business sector γ the
business sector return BUSretγ . In contrast to 10 economic sectors, we are
now able to differentiate more subtly by controlling for 25 business sectors.
The results for our third and strictest model specification, which is formally
given by equation 4, are presented in Table 3. The observable pattern rein-
forces the trend set by the previous specification with 10 economic sectors.
In addition to the CL sample, the CCX sample now starts losing some of
its verve: While there remains evidence of abnormal returns for the longer
event window in panel B, controlling for business sectors in our third speci-
fication renders the statistical significance of abnormal returns in the short
event window non-significant.
Let us take a closer look at the longer event window for the CCX sam-
ple in Table 3. The CARs are positively skewed, with a substantially higher
mean than median value. This holds true for the standardized CARs as well.
The previous specifications have shown consistently lower p-values for the
BMP test in comparison to the KP test. This order has now switched. While
the BMP test statistic implies a p-value above the 10% level, the stricter
KP p-value retains statistical significance at this level. This switch can
be explained by the average correlation of the abnormal returns ρ¯, which
has become slightly negative. The significance of the KP p-value is sup-
ported by the generalized rank test. This third specification suggests that
business sector effects explain an additional part of the positive abnormal
returns. Further indication that controlling for sectoral effects has increased
the explanatory power is reflected by the changes in correlation of the abnor-
mal returns ρ¯ (see the notes in the according tables). This value decreases
steadily with increasingly detailed model specification and tends to converge
towards zero.
In sum, our results suggest that CCX firms have profited from the threat
of regulation in addition to being overrepresented in favorable sectors. CL
firms, on the other hand, were merely riding on the sectors’ coattails.
5.2 Event Returns: CCX membership announcement
Our complementary event study investigates the market reaction to CCX
membership announcements. We identify 26 firms declaring their engage-
ment to the CCX, ranging from the founding members in 2003 up to the last
announcements in 2008. These identified securities do not encompass ADRs,
major listings, or illiquid securities. In a thorough search for confounding
events two trading days before and after all 26 membership announcements
we identify 6 firms for which other substantial information was becoming
public during their announcement periods. This leaves us with a final sam-
ple of 20 firms.
Industry-specific effects are less of a concern in this setting. While the
Waxman-Markey Bill has shown to have had a sudden and highly focused
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impact on entire industries at one point in time, mere membership an-
nouncements should hardly be confounded by such industry-wide effects.
Moreover, our sample is scattered over several years. In contrast to the
Waxman-Markey Bill, however, information leakage poses a potential prob-
lem. To address the possibility that insider information had affected the
stock price before the firms’ public statements, we extend the event window
symmetrically around the announcement dates. In addition to calculat-
ing the cumulated abnormal returns over the short window [0,1] we add
two longer windows, [-1,1] and [-2,2], to allow for a direct comparison with
Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn who used the same windows for CL member-
ship announcements.
Table 4 presents the abnormal return estimates for the CCX membership
announcements. Over the short window, both the ACAR and the ACSAR
are slightly positive. This changes when expanding the event windows, with
the longest window exhibiting negative returns across the board. However,
none of the results are statistically significant. All test statistics are well
above conventional significance levels and hence cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis of normal returns upon the CCX membership announcements. This
indicates that the market was indifferent to the firms’ sudden voluntary en-
gagement in the CCX.
This result qualifies the findings in Gans and Hintermann, where a pos-
itive market reaction was inferred for the same event. In sum, CCX firms
seem to provoke a different market reaction upon membership announce-
ment than CL firms do. Recall that in Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn’s data,
newly announced voluntary engagement in the CL initiative was vigorously
punished with negative abnormal returns.
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Table 3: 4-Factor Business Sector Model
CL&CCX CCX CL
Panel A: Event Window [1,1]
ACAR -0.196 -0.260 -0.063
ACSAR 0.029 0.082 0.021
BMP t-statistic 0.345 0.694 0.213
BMP p-val 0.731 0.493 0.832
KP t-statistic 0.345 0.712 0.199
KP p-val 0.731 0.482 0.844
GRank Test 0.516 0.644 0.577
GRank p-val 0.608 0.522 0.566
No. of Observations 60 31 41
Panel B: Event Window [1,2]
ACAR 0.259 0.684 0.270
ACSAR 0.127 0.303 0.074
BMP t-statistic 0.962 1.679 0.507
BMP p-val 0.340 0.103 0.615
KP t-statistic 0.964 1.722 0.472
KP p-val 0.339 0.095 0.639
GRank Test 1.005 1.674 0.815
GRank p-val 0.319 0.100 0.419
No. of Observations 60 31 41
ACAR & ACSAR are in %. There is a 60 days estimation window from
2 April to 26 June 2009. The event window [1,1] captures the abnormal
returns on 29 June 2009. The event window [1,2] adds 30 June 2009.
The BMP test (Boehmer et al. 1991) is an extension of Patell (1976) and
robust against event induced variance. The KP test (Kolary & Pynnö-
nen, 2010) is adjusting the BMP test for cross sectional correlation. The
average correlations of abnormal returns ρ¯ in our samples are ρ¯cl&ccx =
0.000, ρ¯ccx = -0.002 , and ρ¯cl = 0.004. The non-parametric GRank
test is the generalized rank test for cumulated returns from Kolari and
Pynnönen (2010a).
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Table 4: Three event windows based on the 3-factor model
[0,1] [-1,1] [-2,2]
ACAR 0.150 -0.213 -0.513
ACSAR 0.185 0.168 -0.024
Patell t-statistic 0.813 0.738 -0.107
Patell p-val 0.420 0.464 0.915
BMP t-statistic 0.517 0.319 -0.043
BMP p-val 0.607 0.751 0.966
KP t-statistic 0.455 0.281 -0.038
KP p-val 0.651 0.780 0.970
GRank Test 0.897 0.454 0.011
GRank p-val 0.374 0.651 0.991
Nr. of Observations 20 20 20
ACAR & ACSAR in %. There is a 60 days estimation window from 2 April
to 26 June 2009. The BMP test (Boehmer et al. 1991) is an extension of
Patell (1976) and robust against event induced variance. The KP test (Kolary
& Pynnönen, 2010) is adjusting the BMP test for cross sectional correlation.
The average correlation of abnormal returns ρ¯ in our sample is ρ¯ = 0.015. The
non-parametric GRank test is the generalized rank test for cumulated returns
from Kolari and Pynnönen (2010a).
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6 Conclusion
Conclusive evidence for the motivation to join voluntary environmental ini-
tiatives is instructive for the ongoing discourse about the economic value of
these initiatives. It informs future policy designers of the effects of manda-
tory regulation and lets investors know whether voluntary initiatives are
beneficial. This paper compares the perceived market value of two volun-
tary climate initiatives by exploiting two decisive and unexpected events. In
our principal event study we compare the immediate effect of the Waxman-
Markey Bill on stock prices for members of the Climate Leaders (CL) and the
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), two initiatives who pursued the goal of
curbing CO2 emissions with different strategies. The Waxman-Markey Bill
intended to establish a mandated carbon market in the US and surprisingly
passed the vote in the House of Representatives in June 2009, temporarily
inducing a credible economic threat in the form of unforeseen adjustment
costs in the short run. The close passing of the bill lends itself particu-
larly well to an event study. To round up the picture, in a complementary
event study we compare the market reaction to the preceding membership
announcements to these two initiatives.
On the surface, the market reaction to the Waxman-Markey Bill indi-
cates a positive value correction for both CL and CCX firms, suggesting
that the market considered membership in these initiatives an advantageous
headstart for the seemingly upcoming mandated carbon market. It stands
to reason, however, that the implementation of the Waxman-Markey Bill
would likely have affected entire industries. In a more detailed specification,
we isolate the firm level effect by extending the baseline model specification
with economic and, on a deeper level, business sector returns. This puts
the positive market reaction towards the CL and the CCX firms into per-
spective. Members of the CCX continue to show positive abnormal returns,
albeit at decidedly lower levels. For the CL firms the industry effects fully
account for the observed positive returns during the passage of the bill.
In our complementary event study, we investigate and compare the ear-
lier market reactions towards membership announcements to these initia-
tives. In their event study, Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) found sig-
nificant negative effects when firms announced their CL engagement. How
do new CCX members fare in direct comparison? Our results cannot reject a
neutral market reaction for CCX membership announcements, contradicting
previous findings. In contrast to the negative CL effects, our results indi-
cate that the market had not believed that, on the whole, CCX engagement
would be a detrimental venture. Obviously, both initiatives entailed consid-
erable costs for the firms in the short run. The reactions to the membership
announcements would then suggest that the advantages of membership out-
weighed these costs for the CCX engagement but not for the CL initiative.
In other words, there only seemed good reason to join the CCX, not the CL.
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Taken together, the market reactions in light of the two events paint a
coherent picture of the perceived value of membership in the two initiatives.
CCX membership announcements per se did not provoke a market reaction,
but membership was deemed beneficial in riskier times. The significant ab-
normal returns for the CCX members during the passage of the bill are likely
to be explained by the fact that this program had already effectively mir-
rored the workings of a regulatory cap-and-trade system as intended by the
bill. Third party verification of the environmental effort of the CCX mem-
bers only added to the credibility of their commitment. In contrast, the
CL initiative had been penalized upon participation, and membership was
not considered an advantage when the going got tough with the Waxman-
Markey Bill. These market reactions set the CCX apart from the CL, who
followed a less streamlined path for CO2 emission reduction. The CL mem-
bers acquired firm internal knowledge on how to implement an emission
management system and how to identify and pursue reduction opportuni-
ties in general. But the CL members could not gain trading experience and
knowledge from participation in an active carbon market. Moreover, they
relied on self-auditing, raising serious doubts about their credibility.
We caution against generalizing our results. Membership in these ini-
tiatives was voluntary and therefore endogenous. It therefore seems plau-
sible that the observed market reaction for members would establish an
upper bound when thinking about enforcing mandatory membership for
other firms. On the other hand, one might argue that the Waxman-Markey
event came about by a publicly known voting process. Heated discussions
preceded the passage of the bill, so the event cannot be considered fully
dichotomous. This would underestimate the entire effect of mandatory reg-
ulation, for completely unexpected and full inversions would trigger more
pronounced market reactions.
Our results corroborate the hypothesis that, given a proper design, the
market can consider membership in fitting voluntary environmental pro-
grams a worthwhile venture if future regulation is foreshadowing. Effec-
tive preparation seems to be key. Existing empirical evidence has shown
that membership in voluntary environmental initiatives has mixed effects
on stock prices. Such effects could be attributable to diverging beliefs of
investors and firms about the benefit of membership. Our results shed light
on the question which kind of initiatives, if any, the market considers more
expedient in terms of preparation.
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7 Tables
Table A1: Climate Leader Membership Development
Date # Firms Achievers Setters Developers
28.03.2008 162 11 69 82
21.05.2008 172 11 69 92
03.01.2009 249 18 85 146
08.05.2009 264 19 87 158
01.08.2010 * 191 26 93 72
13.02.2011 183 32 100 51
* Retrieved on September 20 2012 from:
http://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/documents/directory.pdf
All other dates are from lists retrieved from www.archive.org
Table A2: No. of Firms in Samples
Waxman-Markey Event Membership Announcements
CL&CCX CCX CL CCX
Identified∗ 84 40 57 26
Confounding events 24 9 16 6
Resulting sample 60 31 41 20
∗ Identified firms without illiquid firms or ADRs.
28
Table A3: Chicago Climate Exchange Firms (CCX) and Event Samples
Firm name Sample membership* Charter member
Abbott Laboratories MA
Agrium U.S. Inc. W&M
Alliant Energy Corporate Services Inc. W&M
American Electric Power MA W&M charter member
Avista Corporation MA W&M
Bank of America Corporation W&M
Baxter International Inc. MA W&M charter member
Boise Paper Holdings, LLC MA W&M
CLECO Corporation W&M
Central Vermont Public Service MA W&M
Dow Corning W&M
DTE Energy Inc MA W&M
DuPont W&M charter member
Eastman Kodak Company W&M
FMC Corporation W&M
Ford Motor Company W&M charter member
Genon Energy Inco. MA
Green Mnt.Power Corp. MA
Intel Corporation MA W&M
Interface, Inc. MA W&M
IBM MA W&M
International Paper W&M charter member
Knoll, Inc. MA W&M
MeadWestvaco Corp. MA W&M charter member
Mirant Corporation W&M
Motorola, Inc. W&M charter member
Neenah Paper Incorporated MA W&M
Nrg Energy Inco. MA
Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc. W&M
PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC W&M
Puget Energy Inco. MA
Safeway Incorporated MA
Steelcase Inc. W&M
TECO Energy, Inc. W&M
Temple-Inland Inc MA W&M charter member
United Technologies Corporation W&M
Waste Management, Inc. MA W&M charter member
Sample membership*: - W&M; Waxman-Markey event sample
- MA; Membership Announcement sam-
ple.
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Table A4: Sample of Climate Leader Firms (CL) for Waxman-Markey Event
Firm name CL status* Charter partner Reduction region
3M achievers U.S. GHG
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. achievers charter partner global GHG
Agilent Technologies setters global GHG
American Electric Power achievers U.S. GHG
Applied Materials, Inc. setters global GHG
Bank of America Corporation setters U.S. GHG
Baxter International Inc. achievers charter partner U.S. GHG
Best Buy Co., Inc. setters U.S. GHG
Calpine setters U.S. GHG
Campbell Soup Company setters U.S. GHG
Caterpillar Inc. achievers global GHG
Cisco Systems, Inc. setters global GHG
Cummins Inc. setters global GHG
Dell Inc. setters global GHG
DuPont Company setters global GHG
Eastman Kodak Company setters charter partner global GHG
Ecolab, Inc. setters U.S. GHG
EMC Corporation setters U.S. GHG
Fairchild Semiconductor setters U.S. GHG
Hasbro, Inc. achievers charter partner U.S. GHG
Intel Corporation setters global GHG
Interface, Inc. setters charter partner U.S. GHG
IBM Corporation achievers charter partner global GHG
International Paper setters charter partner U.S. GHG
Johnson Controls, Inc. setters U.S. GHG
LSI Corporation setters U.S. GHG
Marriott International, Inc. setters U.S. GHG
Merck & Co., Inc. setters global GHG
Millipore Corporation setters global GHG
Coors Brewing Company setters U.S. GHG
FPL Group, Inc. achievers charter partner U.S. GHG
NVIDIA Corporation setters U.S. GHG
Owens Corning setters U.S. GHG
PepsiCo setters U.S. GHG
PPG Industries, Inc. setters global GHG
PSEG setters charter partner U.S. GHG
Staples, Inc. setters charter partner U.S. GHG
Steelcase Inc. setters U.S. GHG
Gap, Inc. setters U.S. GHG
United Technologies Corporation achievers global GHG
Xerox Corporation achievers global GHG
CL status*: Status of Climate Leader member with regard
to emission reduction pledge.
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Table A5: 4-Factor Economic Sector Model
CL&CCX CCX CL
Panel A: event window[1,1]
ACAR -0.047 0.102 -0.082
ACSAR 0.073 0.204 0.011
BMP t-statistic 0.896 1.829 0.118
BMP p-val 0.374 0.077 0.907
KP t-statistic 0.808 1.796 0.100
KP p-val 0.422 0.082 0.920
GRank Test 1.173 1.903 0.513
GRank p-val 0.245 0.062 0.610
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
Panel B: event window[1,2]
ACAR 0.276 0.717 0.294
ACSAR 0.185 0.436 0.063
BMP t-statistic 1.423 2.479 0.432
BMP p-val 0.160 0.019 0.668
KP t-statistic 1.283 2.435 0.367
KP p-val 0.204 0.021 0.715
GRank Test 1.442 2.247 0.664
GRank p-val 0.155 0.028 0.509
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
ACAR & ACSAR are in %. There is a 60 days estimation window from
2 April to 26 June 2009. The event window [1,1] captures the abnormal
returns on 29 June 2009. The event window [1,2] adds 30 June 2009.
The BMP test (Boehmer et al. 1991) is an extension of Patell (1976)
and robust against event induced variance. The KP test (Kolary & Pyn-
nönen, 2010) is adjusting the BMP test for cross sectional correlation.
The average correlations of abnormal returns ρ¯ in our samples are ρ¯cl&ccx
= 0.004, ρ¯ccx = 0.001 , and ρ¯cl = 0.009. The non-parametric GRank
test is the generalized rank test for cumulated returns from Kolari and
Pynnönen (2010a).
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